Sécurité de protocoles cryptographiques fondés sur les codes correcteurs d'erreurs
Léonard Dallot · HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe) · 2010
Cryptography based on error correcting codes appeared in 1968, in the early years of public key cryptography. The purpose of this thesis is the study of the safety of cryptographic constructions belonging to this family.After introducing cryptographic public key notions and reductionist security, we present a rigorous study of the reductionist security three encryption schemes based on error correcting codes: schema McEliece, variant Niederreiter and schema hybrid proposed by N. Sendrier and B. Biswas. The merits of this approach is then illustrated by the cryptanalysis of two variants of the scheme of McEliece to reduce the size of the keys necessary to ensure the confidentiality of exchanges.We then present a reductionist proof of the security of a signature scheme proposed in 2001 by N. courteous, M. and N. Finiasz Sendrier. To achieve this, we show that it is necessary to slightly modify the schema. Finally, we show that the techniques used to construct the above scheme can also be used to construct a signature scheme circles certainly proven threshold.