AWARENESS AND ACTION: A GENERAL SEMANTICS APPROACH TO EFFECTIVE LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR, (PART 4)—INFERENCE-OBSERVATION CONFUSION: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN OBSERVATION AND INFERENCE
Mary P. Lahman · ETC.: A Review of General Semantics · 2014
Premature judgment often prevents us from seeing what is directly in front of us.-S. I. Hayakawa & A. R. Hayakawa (1990, p. 27)Definition: Inference-Observation ConfusionIn previous chapters, we learned how to silently add etcetera to our thinking processes, fully aware that map does not cover all of the territory. It is now time to apply another one of Korzybski's (2000) premises: map is self-reflexive (p. 58). This means we take note of how we are using language from different levels of abstraction. To put this awareness into practice, we need to revisit the structural differential in order to distinguish direct observations (D level descriptions) from inferences (I level assumptions). In this section, we focus on actions that demonstrate an awareness of the verbal levels of abstraction: what we describe is not what we sense and what it means is not what we describe.Because our language does not readily distinguish between observation and inference levels, we rarely speak with resulting from observations. Kenneth Johnson (2004) proposed that facts are statements made after direct observation ... [and are] confined to what one observes, whereas inferences may be constructed before, during, or after an observation ... [and] go beyond what we (p. 14).Consider the following situation: Upon reading about the transgressions of a politician or professional athlete, we often relay the to our friends and family. In doing so, we blindly assume that news outlets have checked their facts. We do not even consider that we may be acting on the basis of assumptions. However, because we did not personally observe the actions, nor verify the validity of the media claims, our conclusions about the athlete may merely be a misguided inference.We need to know what contributes to levels confusion, specifically those between inferences and observations. What follows is an explanation of the contributing factors and correctives needed to proactively address inferenceobservation confusion.Contributing Factors: Inference-Observation ConfusionHaney (1992) explained that when people make an inference but fail to label it as one, they ignore the risks involved. Perhaps we take these uncalculated risks because we forget how little our inferences represent WIGO. We rarely credit the abstraction process for taking uncalculated risks, even though we might acknowledge physiological factors (hunger and fatigue) and psychological factors (values and needs) for inaccurate inferences (Haney, p. 239).For example, after answer questions posed during class, I might infer that have not the assigned material. I may have indeed heard voices and observed one raising a hand to answer, but this does not necessarily mean have not the material. Because I was not physically present when they prepared for class, I should not trust my abstraction; perhaps have the material but are too exhausted to think clearly because of an exam that they took during the preceding class period.As the previous example illustrates, language often contains grammatical markers to indicate whether we actually observed the conclusions that we share with others. I can state as a fact (D-level) that no student answered a question in class today, but I cannot accurately infer that it was because students did not read ('T'-level). Without language structure to help us distinguish between fact and inference, we must employ other techniques to keep us from acting on inferences as if they were facts.Correctives: Inference-Observation ConfusionHaney (1992) proposed that even if we cannot completely avoid making inferences, we can become more alert to the risks that we are taking. First, we need to detect and change inferential statements.Detect Source, Scope, and TimingTo detect our inferences, we need to ask ourselves three important questions:1. …