An Incentive-Compatible Distributed Recommendation Model
Mayra C. Vidal · 2003
research is concerned with the study and development of incentive-compatible exchange mechanisms for recommen- dations in a multiagent system. These mechanism will al- low and motivate agents to create an economy of ideas, where agents trade recommendations between themselves. In this paper we present a domain model and an incentive- compatible protocol for information exchange. Our model captures a subset of the realities of recommendation ex- changes in the Internet. We provide an algorithm that selfish agents can use for deciding whether to exchange recommen- dations and with whom, that is, they can decide who they can trust to provide adequate recommendations. We an- alyze this algorithm and show that, under certain common circumstances, the agents' rational choice is to exchange rec- ommendations. Finally, we have implemented our model and algorithm and tested the performance of various popu- lations. Our results show that both the social welfare and the individual utility of the agents is increased by partici- pating in the exchange of recommendations.