An approach to the liar paradox(New Aspects in Non-Classical Logics and Their Kripke Semantics)
Piotr Łukowski · Institutional Repositories DataBase (IRDB) · 1997
The liar paradox discloses such a property of the natural language which renders possible the formulation of a sentence expressing its own falsehood.Ob- viously the acceptance of such a sentence must result in contradiction.Thus, the so-called "solution of the liar paradox" cannot consist solely in the abolition of paradoxical sentences in question.In opposite, the "liar sentence" seems to require some simple and clear formahzation which would $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$ to treat this sentence as another contradiction.Hence the desired language should contain an instrument to construct self-referential sentences.In this paper, an approach to the liar paradox satisfies two, possibly contro- versial, conditions.The first one is the assumption that the liar paradox is only a sentential language problem.It implies that there is no need to employ predi- cates.According to the second assumption, the sentence expressing the paradox is free from such elements of the language which are not connectives, i.e. there is no place for such additional components like, for example, an agent.Thus, the liar paradox is here an "imer" problem of the almost ordinary sentential language.