Dialog as Collective Thinking
Jens Allwood · 1997
This paper argues that is a real phenomenon and that it occurs in dialog. Dialog is analyzed as coordinated joint activation of factual, emotive and conative information on several levels of awareness. It is claimed that collective as a consequence of its relation to dialog also exhibits these traits. 1. Collective In this paper, I want to argue that is a real phenomenon. In fact, it is a rather mundane ordinary phenomenon which occurs in dialog. The argument goes as follows: If we characterize thinking as cognitive processes involving awareness of, attention to and processing of factual, emotive and conative types of information, we might characterize as interrelated cognitive processes of these types occurring in several individuals. The nature of the relations between individual cognitive processes could be of various kinds. A relatively low requirement would be similarity. Collective would on this criterion occur if several people think alike. However, requiring merely similarity would leave the possibility open that the similarity was accidental or preprogrammed (like in Leibniz Monadology cf. Leibniz, 1952 ). It therefore seems reasonable to primarily require not similarity but mutual influence. Building on influence, we can now further explore the idea of collective as interactive, joint or cooperative thinking. Similarity might then possibly be a product of such mutual influence. By analogy, we might remember that it is not necessary that parts of the brain are similar for us to claim that is an activity associated with the brain. It is influence and coordinated activity which is crucial, not similarity.