Decentralized Federated Learning for IoT Malware Detection at the Multi-Access Edge: A Two-Tier, Privacy-Preserving Design
Mohammed Yahya Asiri, Maher Ali Khemakhem, Reemah M. Alhebshi, Bassma Saleh Alsulami, Fathy Elbouraey Eassa · Future Internet · 2025
Botnet attacks on Internet of Things (IoT) devices are escalating at the 5G/6G multi-access edge, yet most federated learning frameworks for IoT malware detection (FL-IMD) still hinge on a central aggregator, enlarging the attack surface, weakening privacy, and creating a single point of failure. We propose a two-tier, fully decentralized FL architecture aligned with MEC’s Proximal Edge Server (PES)/Supplementary Edge Server (SES) hierarchy. PES nodes train locally and encrypt updates with the Cheon–Kim–Kim–Song (CKKS) scheme; SES nodes verify ECDSA-signed provenance, homomorphically aggregate ciphertexts, and finalize each round via an Algorand-style committee that writes a compact, tamper-evident record (update digests/URIs and a global-model hash) to an append-only ledger. Using the N-BaIoT benchmark with an unsupervised autoencoder, we evaluate known-device and leave-one-device-out regimes against a classical centralized baseline and a cryptographically hardened but server-centric variant. With the heavier CKKS profile, attack sensitivity is preserved (TPR ≥0.99), and specificity (TNR) declines by only 0.20 percentage points relative to plaintext in both regimes; a lighter profile maintains TPR while trading 3.5–4.8 percentage points of TNR for about 71% smaller payloads. Decentralization adds only a negligible per-round overhead for committee finality, while homomorphic aggregation dominates latency. Overall, our FL-IMD design removes the trusted aggregator and provides verifiable, ledger-backed provenance suitable for trustless MEC deployments.