Delegated Proof-of-Stake-Based Incentive Mechanism for Secure and Efficient Blockchain Storage in the Internet of Things
Wencheng Chen, Jun Wang, Jeng‐Shyang Pan, Robert Simon Sherratt, Jin Wang · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · 2025
The explosive growth of Internet of Things (IoT) data demands secure and reliable storage, where traditional centralized solutions often fall short. Blockchain offers decentralization and tamper-resistance, making it a promising foundation for IoT. However, IoT blockchain systems based on Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) face challenges such as weak node incentives, unfair reward distribution, and low consensus efficiency. This paper proposes a fairness-aware incentive mechanism that accounts for both node capability and effort under information asymmetry. By incorporating fairness preferences into the contract design, the mechanism improves participation and motivates sustained effort. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that our approach enhances throughput by about 15%, while achieving revenue fairness, incentive compatibility, and stronger consensus performance. The mechanism’s adaptability makes it suitable for diverse IoT application scenarios.