Unleashing the Power of Differential Fault Attacks on QARMAv2
Soumya Sahoo, Debasmita Chakraborty, Santanu Sarkar · IEEE Transactions on Computers · 2025
QARMAv2, a family of lightweight block ciphers introduced in ToSC 2023, is an evolution of the original QARMA design, specifically constructed to accommodate more extended tweak values while simultaneously enhancing security measures. In this paper, for the first time, we present differential fault analysis (DFA) of all the QARMAv2 variants by introducing an approach to utilize the fault propagation patterns at the nibble level, with the goal of identifying relevant faulty ciphertexts and vulnerable fault positions. Introducing six random nibble faults strategically into the (r– 1)-th and (r– 2)-th backward rounds of ther-round QARMAv2-64 significantly reduces the secret key space from 2128to 232. Additionally, when targeting QARMAv2-128-128, it demands the introduction of six random nibble faults to effectively reduce the secret key space from 2128to a remarkably reduced 224. To conclude, we also explore the potential extension of our methods to conduct DFA on other versions of QARMAv2. To the best of our knowledge, this marks the first instance of a differential fault attack targeting the QARMAv2 tweakable block cipher family, signifying an important direction in cryptographic analysis.