Optimizing Spectrum Sharing in UAV Swarms: A Stackelberg Game-Based Incentive Mechanism
Qin Wang, Yi Shen, Longting Xu, Hui Zhang, Haitao Zhao, Hongbo Zhu · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology · 2025
In this paper, we propose an innovative spectrum sharing incentive mechanism tailored for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarms, utilizing a Stackelberg game framework. This mechanism enables multiple UAV-to-UAV (U2U) links to effectively share the spectrum resources of a single UAV-to-Base Station (U2B) link. We commence by designing a hybrid overlay-underlay spectrum access mode, addressing the challenge of inter-user interference. Subsequently, the spectrum sharing issue is formulated as a Stackelberg game model, where U2B links are positioned as leaders and U2U links as followers. This model facilitates an interactive environment where both entities converge on an optimal trading strategy, encompassing the determination of the ideal trading price and allocation of resource blocks (RBs). To further enhance this system, we employ a utility-based matching strategy. This strategy ensures that U2U links select the U2B link that optimizes their utility, while the U2B link, in turn, chooses the U2U link that maximizes its utility from the pool of applicants seeking spectrum sharing. Simulation results underscore the effectiveness of this approach, showcasing significant improvements in both system utility and the per-unit utility of spectrum resources. Additionally, our mechanism successfully incentivizes more UAV users to engage in a mutually beneficial spectrum sharing arrangement.