Game Theory: Cyber Deception Based on the Redundancy of Diversified Honeypots
Benjamin Malamu Dumisani, Hakima Ould‐Slimane · Procedia Computer Science · 2025
Today, cyber deception is an essential element of proactive and reactive defense systems. Military equipment is increasingly connected to the Internet, and next-generation network security is becoming increasingly complex. This vast network of military tactics thus becomes exposed and vulnerable, opening a battlefield against cyberattacks. The security of such a network is therefore paramount. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic cyber deception approach for the allocation of diversified honeypots. To ensure high availability of our security measure, we opt for diversified redundancy in honeypot placement. We will analyze the impact on the defender’s reward, with or without the attacker’s success probability. The optimization will be solved using the Nash balance. Regarding honeypot placement, we adopt a deployment with redundancy to guarantee the security of critical nodes. Our results show that redundancy strengthens the ability to diversify the honeypot, thus ensuring long-term network security.