Ransomware in Resource-Constrained Industrial IoT Networks: There Actually is a Threat
Yuxiang Huang, Calvin Brierley, Adel ElZemity, James Pope, Jiteng Ma, Antonio Di Buono, Budi Arief, George Oikonomou · 2025
The threat of ransomware attacks against Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) networks, particularly networks of resource-constrained devices, is starting to become a reality. In this paper, we contend that the threat of ransomware infection of an IIoT environment is not only plausible, but that it also exhibits different properties compared to ransomware attacks against traditional desktop systems, necessitating a new and more appropriate approach to deal with this threat. In particular, we articulate the unique characteristics of ransomware behaviour in IIoT networks considering the distinctive characteristics, such as computationally-constrained devices and low-power wireless communication protocols. Furthermore, we outline the necessary attributes for ransomware to effectively compromise and propagate within IIoT networks. To back our argument, we present a proof-of-concept (PoC) IIoT ransomware prototype. To highlight the generality of our work, we have developed the prototype for two different hardware platforms, powered by two different open source embedded operating systems: Contiki-NG and Zephyr. The results underscore the feasibility of ransomware attacks against networks of resource-constrained IIoT devices, providing evidence of the real threat posed by such attacks in these environments. Finally, our PoC prototype can serve as a foundation for future research focused on securing these potentially vulnerable networks.