FL-CDF: Collaborative Defense Framework for Backdoor Mitigation in Federated Learning
Haiyan Zhang, Xinghua Li, Yinbin Miao, Shunjie Yuan, Mengyao Zhu, Ximeng Liu, Robert Huijie Deng · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · 2025
Federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to backdoor attacks due to its distributed nature. Existing unilateral defense mechanisms often fail against persistent attack strategies, primarily due to their limited perspectives. To address the challenge of model misclassification on the server side caused by overlooked model similarity drift, and gradient misjudgment on the client side caused by semantic learning imbalances across classes, this paper proposes a collaborative defense framework for federated learning, termed FL-CDF. FL-CDF establishes an end-to-end defense through a bidirectional client-server collaboration mechanism. Specifically: (1) On the client side, an adversarial perturbation-based malicious neuron detection module is introduced. This module measures neuron activation sensitivity by generating adversarial perturbations, and adaptively prunes backdoor neurons exhibiting high sensitivity. (2) On the server side, a multi-dimensional detection scheme is designed, which integrates neuron localization, adversarial sensitivity, and model parameters. By incorporating client-side feedback on malicious neurons, the server performs robust model aggregation. Theoretical analysis verifies the robustness of FL-CDF, and extensive experiments on public benchmarks demonstrate its effectiveness. In the best-case scenario, FL-CDF improves defense performance by 42.5% compared to current state-of-the-art (SOTA) defense.