Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Relay and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network
Weiyi Wang, Yutao Jiao, Jin Chen, Wenting Dai, Jiawen Kang, Yuhua Xu · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · 2025
In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are allocated only to full nodes (miners), neglecting relay nodes and diminishing participation incentives for lightweight nodesparticularly in energy-constrained wireless blockchain environments. This paper proposes a novel dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for both relay and validation activities in the wireless blockchain network. The proposed one consists of two sub-auction stages: the relay sub-auction and the validation subauction. In the relay sub-auction, relay nodes select transactions to forward based on rewards. Additionally, nodes adjust the relay probability using a no-regret algorithm to enhance efficiency. In the validation sub-auction, full nodes use the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to select transactions and construct the block. Our mechanism demonstrably satisfies Incentive Compatible (IC), Individual Rational (IR), and Computationally Efficient (CE) while maintaining bounded social welfare optimization. Furthermore, we consider the impact of network complexity on blockchain performance. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that the proposed one reduces energy and bandwidth resource consumption without compromising the throughput and security of the wireless blockchain network.