Why Information Philosophy Based on Computational Ontology Failed to Complete the Information Turn
Wei He, No. 28, Xianning West Road, Xi’an 710049, China · Information Theories and Applications · 2025
Floridi proposes an informational turn in philosophy, arguing that such a turn would revolutionise the overall way in which problems are dealt with in old and new philosophies and bring about substantial innovations in philosophical systems. However, Floridi attempts to propose an information ontology on analytic philosophical principles, and the resulting Kantian regression can only exacerbate the conflicting elements of agnosticism and metaphysics, and subsequently it causes the uncertainty of the information being so that the essence of being should concede to computating, towards a computational ontology. This turn does not seem to be complete, and does not give a transformative solution to the old and new problems of philosophy. Although this turn is still a positive attempt to save the metaphysics lost under digital ontology. But Floridi fails to realise that simply adding information to structural positivism, while still following the original core of structural realism, will not create a new information theory of ontology, as its focus is still on structural realism and not on information.