The Rise of GPS Spoofing Attacks on Drones in the Russia-Ukraine War
Noor Ul Amin Jhanjhi, Fardeen Sameer Khan, Mohamud Abdi, Hans Andre Bin Azwan Rasyid, Shahriar Hossain Istiq, Liu Jiakang, Shadman Sakib Sadvi · 2025
Fardeen Sameer Khan, Mohamud Abdi, Hans Andre Bin Azwan Rasyid, Shahriar Hossain Istiq, Liu Jiakang, Shadman Sakib Sadvi, Noor Ul [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] , [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have now become invaluable assets in modern warfare, offering capabilities in reconnaissance and intelligence gathering and offenses against precision. The systems are, however, highly vulnerable to GPS spoofing, which is perhaps the most serious threat that can confront drone systems. By transmitting phantom GPS signals, the navigational controls of a UAV could be compromised by an adversary. The flight path could be diverted; the mission could be rendered abortive; the drone could be taken over completely. The very same method has been put in use in a number of prominent instances of warfare, such as during the Russia-Ukraine war and the Iranian capture of the U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel drone in 2011.This study presents a novel method for the detection and attribution of GPS spoofing attacks against UAVs for military purposes. The method is built around three main components: digital signal acquisition, anomaly detection in GPS data, RF spectrum analysis, and attribution of actors. The research canvasses the legality of GPS spoofing under international law from the relevant perspective of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the Geneva Conventions, and the Tallinn Manual 2.0. The investigations emphasize key vulnerabilities in UAV navigation systems based on a single source of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). Hence, it suggests that to increase resilience, multiple GNSS platforms like Galileo, BeiDou, GLONASS, and M-Code GPS be integrated with cryptographic anti-spoofing techniques and anomaly detection using AI. Cybersecurity should include advanced technical means and comprehensive legal measures to safeguard UAVs in modern combat.Keywords: UAV, GPS Spoofing, Drones, Security, Navigation SystemIntroductionBackground of Drone Cyber WarfareThe introduction gives a comprehensive overview of the increasing reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in modern warfare, as well as on highlighting the critical cybersecurity threats they are susceptible to—more specifically, GPS spoofing. UAVs have become strategic assets for military forces due to their capability to offer real-time reconnaissance, precision strikes, and advanced intelligence gathering. Equipped with onboard sensors, imaging systems, and AI-based analysis tools, these drones enhance battlefield awareness and decision-making without putting human lives at risk. The United States, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and China are some of the countries that have now integrated UAVs into military operations, utilizing their autonomous or semi-autonomous feature for effective and safer military maneuvering. These advantages, however, are not cyber-physical system-free as UAVs rely on cyber-physical systems like Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for navigation, satellite communications (SATCOM) for far-off control, and artificial intelligence (AI) for targeting and mission completion. This dependence leaves them exposed to cyberattacks, and among the most efficient and most utilized is GPS spoofing[1-2]. In a spoofing attack, fake GPS signals are sent by the attackers, which mislead the UAV to accept incorrect coordinates, resulting in navigational failure, loss of control, or forced landing in enemy territory. The threat is not just theoretical; real events provide a testament to its operational danger. For example, in the Russia-Ukraine war, Russian electronic warfare systems such as the Krasukha-4 and Borisoglebsk-2 reportedly jammed Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 drone operations through GPS spoofing. Similarly, in 2011, Iran allegedly used spoofing methods to hijack an American RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone and bring it back safely and then reverse-engineer its technology subsequently. Such examples go on to demonstrate that GPS spoofing is not a theoretical cybersecurity risk but a tactical, operational tool that directly shifts the game of warfare as it stands today[3].Cyber Threats to Military DronesThis section deals with the cyber threats that military drones face.