Leakage-Resilient Easily Deployable and Efficiently Searchable Encryption (EDESE)
Jiaming Yuan, Yingjiu Li, Jun Li, Daoyuan Wu, Jianting Ning, Yangguang Tian, Robert Huijie Deng · 2025
Easily Deployable and Efficiently Searchable Encryption (EDESE) is a cryptographic primitive designed for practical searchable applications, offering efficient search and easy deployment. However, it remains vulnerable to Leakage-Abuse attacks, allowing adversaries to exploit keyword-matching processes to extract sensitive information. To address these vulnerabilities, we introduce Leakage-Resilient EDESE (LR-EDESE) with k-indistinguishability and controlled leakage functions. We then propose Volume Leakage-Resilient EDESE (VLR-EDESE), a new scheme to protect against both query and document volume leakage. Our experimental results demonstrate that at k = 5000 (maximum security setting), VLR-EDESE incurs an overhead of 63× compared to the baseline EDESE without leakage protection, outperforming state-of-the-art methods with 320× and 97× overhead, respectively. For smaller k values (10, 20, 50, 100), storage and communication overhead remain within 2× and 2.5× of the baseline EDESE, highlighting VLR-EDESE's flexibility. Finally, we present CloudSec, an implementation of VLR-EDESE that seamlessly integrates with cloud storage platforms, using OneDrive as an example.