Exploiting ARMeD Channels By Reverse Engineering ARM Memory Disambiguation Unit
Chang Liu, Zhouyang Li, Haixia Wang, Pengfei Qiu, Gang Qu, Dongsheng Wang · IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems · 2025
ARM CPUs are widely used in both embedded systems and personal computers where security considerations are becoming important. Evidently, vulnerabilities on hardware components such as cache and translation look-aside buffer are well-documented. But there are much less studies on other components, especially those in the CPU backend, largely due to the unavailability of their design and implementation details. To address this gap, we present the first in-depth reverse engineering analysis of the Memory Disambiguation Unit (MDU) in the backend of ARM CPUs. Across four microarchitectures from ARM and Apple CPUs, we identify two different MDU designs, switch-based and counter-based. We then analyze the state machine, selection mechanism, and organization of these MDU designs. We further propose new side channels and covert channels, which we call ARMeD channels, that exploit ARM MDU to leak information. We demonstrate with three attacks using ARMeD channels: a cross-process covert channel, website fingerprinting, and a new implementation of the Spectre attack. Finally, we present a defense strategy against ARMeD Channels with less than 3% degradation on the MDU’s prediction accuracy.