Weight and authority in formal models of precedential constraint
Robert Mullins · Jurisprudence · 2025
Scholars and theorists of the common law often observe that precedents vary in their weight or force. In this article, I explore the plausibility of this idea from a formal perspective. I offer a simple formal account of the varying force of precedent, which draws upon John Horty's (2011) factor-based model of precedential constraint. The framework accommodates the idea that precedents carry varying levels of priority or strength, though it does not allow us to use cardinal weights to represent their relative priority. I then draw on this framework to make two arguments of broader theoretical significance. First, I make a formal argument against interpreting strictly authoritative precedent in terms of prioritising or reweighting reasons. Second, I argue that the model can be used to demonstrate how the practice of legal officials could be used to extract a meaningful measure of weight.