SIX Authority without consent
Burke A. Hendrix · Penn State University Press eBooks · 2008
In the last chapter, I argued that state authority must be justified by natural duties to aid others in protecting themselves, a position adopted as an explicit alternative to consent.Yet simply showing that duties to aid exist, and that they are in principle coercible, leaves an important question open: do states really provide the best mechanism for fulfilling these duties?Given the historical mistreatment indigenous peoples have suffered at the hands of states, the dangers posed by states have to be compared seriously with the benefits.In this chapter, I will evaluate the general case for states as a form of political organization and consider what this case might tell us about the claims of real states over particular territories and populations, including indigenous peoples.The central arguments in this chapter will be that natural duties really do require us to support states as a type of organization, and that they contingently require us to support stable democratic states where they exist, while requiring a more ambiguous response toward nondemocratic states.But the reasons for supporting the status quo are generally pragmatic ones involving the difficulties of widespread political change, and the presumption in its favor can be rebutted if mechanisms for peaceful and orderly revisions can be found.In Chapter 7, I will defend a procedural conception of self-determination, in which groups seeking a changed political status must pass multiple carefully designed referenda, and in Chapters 8 and 9 I will consider what this might say about the future status of indigenous peoples.