VFLMonitor: Defending One-Party Hijacking Attacks in Vertical Federated Learning
Xiangrui Xu, Yiwen Zhao, Yufei Han, Zhu Yongsheng, Zhen Han, Guangquan Xu, Bin Wang, Shouling Ji, Wei Wang · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · 2025
Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) is susceptible to various one-party hijacking attacks, such as Replay and Generation attacks, where a single malicious client can manipulate the model to produce attacker-specified results, thereby compromising its reliability in real-world deployments. In this paper, we first uncover the underlying mechanisms of these attacks and observe that successful attacks induce significant discrepancies in the embedding-label associations across different clients. We establish a theoretical framework demonstrating how these discrepancies can serve as reliable indicators for detecting hijacking attempts. Building upon this insight, we propose VFLMonitor, a robust defense mechanism that leverages these embedding-label discrepancies to detect and mitigate hijacking attacks. Specifically, VFLMonitor identifies suspicious queries by analyzing differences in label estimations from multiple clients and applies a majority voting rule to correct or filter out these malicious queries. Moreover, VFLMonitor introduces a novel regularization strategy during training to reduce intra-class variance in embeddings, thereby enhancing their discriminative power and improving defense effectiveness. Extensive experi21 ments were conducted on 5 real-world datasets against 2 different attack types under 3 attack scenarios. The results demonstrate that VFLMonitor can effectively identify and exclude potential hijacked requests in all types of one-party hijacking attacks, while maintaining a meager false positive rate for legitimate queries.