Game-Theoretic Incentive Mechanism for Blockchain-Based Federated Learning
Wenzheng Tang, Erwu Liu, Wei Ni, Xinyu Qu, Butian Huang, Kezhi Li, Dusit Tao Niyato, Abbas Jamalipour · IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing · 2025
Blockchain-based federated learning (BFL) has gained attention for its potential to establish decentralized trust. While existing research primarily focuses on personalized frameworks for various applications, essential aspects including incentive mechanisms—critical for ensuring stable system operation—remain under-explored. To bridge this gap, we propose a game-theoretic incentive mechanism designed to foster active participation in BFL tasks. Specifically, we model a BFL system comprising a model owner (MO), i.e., task publisher, multiple miners, and training terminals, framing their interactions through two-tier Stackelberg games. In the first-tier game, the MO designs reward strategies to incentivize training terminals to contribute more data, enhancing model accuracy. The second-tier game introduces a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game, enabling miners to set model packaging prices based on competitors' strategies and anticipated user behavior. By deriving the Stackelberg equilibrium, we identify optimal strategies for all participants, leading to an incentive mechanism balancing individual interests with overall performance. Compared to its benchmarks, our incentive mechanism offers 5.8% and 53.4% higher utilities in the two games compared to its alternatives, accelerating convergence and improving accuracy.