Probabilistic Byzantine Attack on Federated Learning
Tsung-Hsuan Wang, Po‐Ning Chen, Yu-Chih Huang · IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing · 2025
In this paper, motivated by the severe effects of black-box evasion attacks on machine learning, we investigate the vulnerability of Byzantine attacks to federated learning (FL) systems. Existing studies predominantly evaluate their defense strategies using monotonous Byzantine attacks in the training stage, which fail to consider the public dataset’s characteristics. This oversight may undermine the confidence in Byzantine defense strategies. In this work, we investigate the issue from the perspective of a Byzantine attacker instead of focusing on mitigate Byzantine attacks as a system designer. Adopting a specific learning task as example, we examine it using an optimal probabilistic Byzantine attack policy, which we extend from the research scope introduced in [12]. Specifically, we determine the minimum Byzantine effort required to manipulate the sample distribution in the testing stage to given Byzantine sample distributions. Then, we derived the optimal and nearoptimal Byzantine sample distributions subject to a fixed compromising effort. Additionally, a closed-form expression of optimal weights for FL is obtained, via which a connection between the optimal weights and those obtained from the FL training can be established. Through numerical experiments, we confirm the effectiveness of the proposed probabilistic Byzantine attack, which can serve as a good test to anti-attack defense strategies.