DoS-FPGA: Denial of Service on Cloud FPGAs via Coordinated Power Hammering
Hassan Nassar, Philipp Machauer, Lars Bauer, Dennis R. E. Gnad, Mehdi Baradaran Tahoori, Jörg Henkel · 2024
The adoption of FPGA instances by major cloud service providers (CSPs) reflects the growing demand for accelerated and heterogeneous computing across various applications, e.g., AI. To improve the efficiency, utilization and virtualization, multi-tenant FPGAs allow multiple users to utilize FPGA resources concurrently, with each FPGA partition assigned to a separate tenant. However, this introduces significant security vulnerabilities, such as the potential for attacks by configuring a malicious circuit in one tenant's FPGA partition. One notable vulnerability is disrupting the FPGA's power distribution network, leading to faults or even crashing the entire FPGA, affecting other tenants. Usually, such an attack requires a considerable amount of resources. A naive solution would be splitting an FPGA into smaller fractions to reduce the potential for successful Power-Hammering by individual tenants and enhance the security. However, our paper demonstrates that even with smaller fractions per tenant, attacks can still occur. We propose the threat of coordinated attacks, where malicious tenants use an unintended covert channel between them. We practically validate this threat in a real cloud computing environment by introducing a synchronized and coordinated power-hammering attack from multiple malicious tenants. These tenants synchronize their actions using a voltage-based covert channel. Our results reveal the success of the attack, surpassing state-of-the-art countermeasures and detection mechanisms with a success rate exceeding 90%, compared to 30% for uncoordinated attacks.