Secure Communication Against Active AAV Eavesdropper: A Fingerprint-Localization and Channel Tracking Approach
Xinyao Wang, Zhong Zheng, Zesong Fei, Qingqing Wu · IEEE Transactions on Communications · 2025
Autonomous aerial vehicle (AAV) can be threatening to the information security of wireless communications. By launching the pilot spoofing attack (PSA), a AAV, operating as the active aerial-eavesdropper (A-Eve), is able to intercept the confidential messages sent over the air. On one hand, it is difficult to distinguish the channel state information (CSI) of the ground users (GUs) and the CSI of A-Eve in the contaminated pilots. On the other hand, due to the high-mobility of A-Eve, the CSI of A-Eve is rapidly changing, making the design of secure transmissions challenging. To address these issues, we first propose a location-based minimum mean square error (MMSE) channel estimation algorithm to separate the CSI of GUs and the CSI of A-Eve, where the location of A-Eve is obtained by designing a cooperative localization neural network (CLNet), leveraging its angular-domain channel fingerprint (CF) of A-Eve. Furthermore, we propose an artificial noise (AN) injected MMSE precoding scheme to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate of the multi-user communications, where the power allocation between signal and AN is optimized via a long short-term memory (LSTM)-based secure predictive beamforming neural network (SPBNet). Numerical results verify the secrecy performance gain of the proposed scheme achieved by utilizing the localization ability via the CLNet and the channel tracking ability via the SPBNet, compared to the canonical nullspace AN injection scheme without prior knowledge of A-Eve’s location.