Leading Hide Bribery Stubborn Mining Attack
Weipeng Liang, Shan Jiang, Weijie Li, Yu Wang · 2024
In an incentive-driven blockchain system, miners will mine with the aim of maximizing revenue. The emergence of selfish mining attack increase their own revenue through compromising the blockchain way. Although selfish mining can achieve significant results in blockchain mining, they ignore the impact of forks on the efficiency of block mining. The traditional series of selfish mining attacks have certain limitations when considering the form of forking, they use the form of creating a double-fork to eliminate the public chain blocks, this way in the same block length can only eliminate a block, the attacker's block occupancy in this case is also subject to certain limitations. However, in the actual blockchain situation, it is not ruled out that a triple-fork will be created. Therefore, we proposed Leading Hide Bribery Stubborn Mining (LHBSbM) by combining the limitations of the double-fork form as well as the practical situation. we analyzed the incentive threshold of rational miners in the presence of blockchain forks, and give appropriate bribes to make the rational miners' mining power available to the attacker. Then, by leading covert actions, create a blockchain triple-fork to annex the blocks of honest miners and rational miners. Experimental results show that LHBSbM can effectively increase the block abandonment rate, extend the attacker's leading time, and optimize the attacker's mining revenue.