Social-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Data Quality in Mobile Crowdsensing: A Three-Stage Stackelberg Game Approach
Hai Yu, Peng Li, Weiyi Huang, Rui Du, Qin Xu, Lei Nie, Haizhou Bao, Qin Liu · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · 2025
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) leverages large-scale mobile users to execute tasks and contribute sensing data. Developing an effective incentive mechanism is critical to ensure both the quality and quantity of sensing data. However, existing incentive mechanisms often overlook key factors, such as the social networks of users, the presence of malicious participants, and the dynamic interplay among multiple stakeholders. In this article, we propose a Trilateral Social-aware Incentive Mechanism (TSIM) to address these limitations. TSIM is built upon a three-stage Stackelberg game framework that incorporates social relationships to enhance recruitment and improve data quality. First, we analyze the data quality and the historical reputation of the users, and based on this, we construct utility functions for the requester, service provider, and mobile users, with the latter integrating data quality, personal, social, and historical reputation utilities. Second, we formulate the payment problem as a three-stage game among the three parties, employing backward induction to derive optimal strategies that maximize their respective utilities. Next, we theoretically prove the unique existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium, ensuring a multiwin outcome. Numerical experiments demonstrate that incorporating social networks significantly boosts task participation and rewards for users, increases profit for the requester and revenue for the service provider, and effectively mitigates malicious data uploads.