Security Proof of SSSD Protocols Built on Top of SMC Protocol
Mohammad Anagreh, Peeter Laud · Preprints.org · 2024
Secure Secret Sharing Single-Source Shortest Distance (SSSD) protocols, built on the Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) foundation, have emerged as a promising solution to address the secure distribution and management of sensitive secrets among multiple parties. This paper focuses on the crucial aspect of security proof within SSSD protocols based on SMC, aiming to provide a scientifically rigorous understanding of the formal verification process and the robust guarantees they offer. Through a comprehensive examination of the fundamental principles underpinning SMC and the specific design considerations unique to SSSD protocols, this paper meticulously explores the key components and intricate steps involved in constructing a rigorous security proof. Furthermore, it discusses the adversarial model, precise security definitions, cryptographic assumptions utilized within the proof, and sophisticated techniques and reductions to establish its validity. By means of a meticulous analysis of the security proof for SSSD protocols, this paper critically evaluates both the strengths and limitations of the proposed approach, offering valuable insights to inform future research and development within this significant domain of study.