Stackelberg Game-Based Crowdsourcing for Hybrid V2X Communications
Zhenjie Deng, Dehuan Wan, Chunhui Wu, Chen Bian, Dacai Liu · IEEE Communications Letters · 2024
Crowdsourcing among vehicles, pedestrians, and Base Stations (BSs) in hybrid V2X networks offers a promising approach to enhance subscriber experience by increasing throughput, ensuring driving safety, and supporting autonomous driving. In this letter, we focus on a cooperative hybrid V2X network where vehicles can transmit data directly from base stations through cellular networks or use other vehicles as relays. After recruiting the relay clients to provide cooperative transmission service, the primary client determines how to allocate its traffic among them. Both primary and relay clients aim to maximize their respective reward. This model is formulated as a Stackelberg game. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) point is achieved under constraints. Simulation results demonstrate that cooperation among vehicles and pedestrians improves the performance of primary clients and encourages relay client participation.