Blockchain-inspired Incentive Mechanism for Trust-aware Offloading in Mobile Edge Computing
Ahmed Alioua, Nesrine Bouchemal, Randa Mati, Mohamed‐Lamine Messai · 2024
This paper tackles the pressing concern of establishing trust within the context of Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) to enhance security in task-offloading interactions. MEC’s potential to optimize service performance is contingent on seamless and secure interactions among its diverse entities, comprising mobile terminals and edge servers. To bridge this trust gap, we propose a robust trust management system that exploits the capabilities of blockchain technology. This system encompasses a trust management mechanism founded on a reputation metric, serving as the cornerstone for engendering trust in MEC transactions. In addition, the proposed solution is completed by an incentive approach embedded within game theory, meticulously designed to augment block mining efficiency. We adopt a Stackelberg game to model the intricate dynamics of interaction within this context, aptly capturing the verification incentive problem. This game orchestrates the actions of a leader (edge server) and subsequent followers (mobile terminals), leveraging a trustworthy offloading strategy formulation that culminates in optimal block validation decision-making. Our proposal guarantees the reliability of the offloading process and establishes a favorable relationship of confidence between the offloading system entities.