Securing Post-Quantum DNSSEC Against Fragmentation Mis-Association Threat
Manohar Raavi, Simeon Wuthier, Sang‐Yoon Chang · 2024
Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) uses public-key digital signatures to provide integrity and authentication for DNS query responses. The current standardized DNS for reliable UDP delivery limits DNS response (including the message, signature, and public key) to a maximum of 1232 bytes. Incorporating NIST's post-quantum digital signatures into the DNS protocol results in a response size that exceeds the limit set by the Ethernet standardization, making PQC incompatible with the current standardized DNS. To address the incompatibility and enable PQC to protect the authenticity against the quantum-equipped adversaries, previous research proposed fragmenting the DNSSEC messages. Fragmentation however exposes DNSSEC to Fragmentation Mis-Association threat, traditionally studied in the broader IP fragmentation contexts and not applicable in the current DNSSEC with classical/pre-quantum cipher (no fragmentation needed). We distinguish our work from the previous research incorporating PQC to DNSSEC to defend against the Fragmentation Mis-Association Threat by chaining the fragments and applying cryptographic commit-and-reveal. We also advance the previous research and further reduce the number of packet fragments, which can be particularly useful as the DNSSEC based on UDP is prone to packet transmission failure increasing the chance of the DNS response failure when sent in multiple fragments, by using blockchain to offload and enable the offline delivery of the public key. Our scheme thus even allows the Falcon-512 PQC cipher incorporation to forgo the fragmentation, in contrast to the previous research requiring fragmentation for Falcon-512; the other PQC ciphers, i.e., Dilithium ciphers and Falcon-1024, still require fragmentation in our scheme due to the standardized signature sizes. We implement our scheme and analyze the effectiveness and performances through experimentation.