Prime+Reset: Introducing A Novel Cross-World Covert-Channel Through Comprehensive Security Analysis on ARM TrustZone
Yun Chen, Arash Pashrashid, Yongzheng Wu, Trevor E. Carlson · 2024
ARM TrustZone, a robust security mechanism, aims to protect against a wide range of threats by partitioning the system-on-chip hardware and software into two distinct worlds, namely the normal world and the secure world. However, the secure world still remains susceptible to malicious attacks, including side-channel and covert-channel vulnerabilities. Previous efforts to leak data from TrustZone focused on cache-based and performance monitoring unit (PMU)-based channels; in this paper, we, however, propose a security analysis benchmark suite by traversing the hardware components involved in the microarchitecture to study their security impact on the secure world. Our investigation unveils an undisclosed leakage source stemming from the L2 prefetcher. We design a new cross-core and cross-world covert-channel attack based on our reverse engineering of the L2 prefetcher, named Prime+Reset. Compared to most cross-world covert-channel attacks, Prime+Reset is a cache- and PMU-agnostic attack that effectively bypasses many existing defenses. The throughput of Prime+Reset can achieve 776 Kib/s, which demonstrates a significant improvement, 70 ×, over the state-of-the-art, while maintaining a similar error rate (< 2 %). One can find the code at https://github.com/yunchen-juuuump/prime-reset.