6G Security: The Vulnerability of Roaming Technology via DoS Exploit of Signaling Control Plane
Chia‐Hao Chang, Rui-Lin Chang, Hong-Yen Chen, Tsung-Nan Lin · 2024
As the next generation leap in mobile communication technology, 6G not only brings forward innovative visions but also poses new challenges to traditional security architectures. Considering that standard organizations are concluding their discussions on application scenarios and key technologies, our focus has subsequently intensified on the security aspects of 6G. Particularly noteworthy is the role of roaming, which has evolved from a specialized function to a key enabler of global coverage in 6G. However, is the current roaming technology adequately equipped to handle the widespread usage anticipated in the future? Previous research indicates that this remains an unresolved issue. As the architectures of 5G and 6G are compatible, we focused our study on the scenario of 5G roaming. Following a series of investigations, two vulnerabilities within the 3GPP defined roaming control plane protocols were identified. Additionally, we discovered two viable signaling DoS attack models in roaming and demonstrated the repercussions posed by these vulnerabilities practically. Our findings also reveal that roaming exacerbates the impact of attacks on the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN). Compared to non-roaming scenarios, the two types of orchestrated attacks in roaming magnified the attack impact by factors of 1.26 and 2.69, respectively. Although threats of roaming have been previously proposed in past studies. Our research provides the first quantifiable experimental validation of these threats.