DYST (Did You See That?): An Amplified Covert Channel That Points To Previously Seen Data
Steffen Wendzel, Tobias Schmidbauer, Sebastian Zillien, Jörg Keller · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · 2024
Covert channels are stealthy communication channels that enable manifold adversary and legitimate scenarios, ranging from stealthy malware communications to the exchange of confidential information by journalists. We present DYST, which represents a new class of covert channels we callhistory covert channelsjointly with the new paradigm of covert channelamplification. All covert channels described until now need to craft seemingly legitimate flows or need to modify third-party flows, mimicking unsuspicious behavior. In contrast, history covert channels can communicate bypointingtounaltered legitimatetraffic created by regular network nodes. Only a negligible fraction of the covert communication process requires the transfer of actual covert channel information by the covert channel's sender. This information can be sent through different protocols/channels. Our methodology allows anamplificationof the covert channel's message size, i.e., minimizing the fraction ofactually transferredsecret data by a covert channel's sender in relation to theoverallsecret data being exchanged. Further, we extend the current taxonomy for covert channels to show how history channels can be categorized. We describe multiple scenarios in which history covert channels can be realized, analyze the characteristics of these channels, and show how their configuration can be optimized.