DNS cache poisoning attack detection: a systematic review
Osama Alsad, Qasem S. Abu Al-Haija · IET conference proceedings. · 2024
Domain names are essential to the internet because they provide user-friendly and memorable website URLs. Clients rely on the conventional Domain Name System (DNS) execution procedure to transform domain names into matching IP addresses, providing easy access to requested websites. However, the ever-changing cybersecurity tool environment has presented new obstacles, notably in cache poisoning assaults. Cache poisoning attacks, long considered sophisticated and unusual, have become more accessible to malevolent actors as hacking tools and tactics have advanced. These assaults can potentially jeopardize the integrity of DNS data, with serious ramifications for persons and businesses. The cost of recovering from such assaults may be tremendous, and the expenditure necessary for successful detection has skyrocketed. In this regard, this study investigates various novel strategies offered to counteract DNS cache poisoning. By examining the dynamic nature of this danger, we want to give insights and solutions to protect the DNS ecosystem's dependability and security. These strategies include several methodologies, such as anomaly detection, cryptographic protections, and real-time monitoring, providing a full toolset for preventing cache poisoning and maintaining the reliability of domain name resolution.