Knowing the Model
Sergei Nikolaevich Artemov · arXiv (Cornell University) · 2016
Epistemic modal logic normally views an epistemic situation as a Kripke model. We consider a more basic approach: to view an epistemic situation as a set W of possible states/worlds -- maximal consistent sets of propositions -- with conventional accessibility relations determined by W. We find that in many epistemic situations, W is not a Kripke model: a necessary and sufficient condition for W to be a Kripke model is the so-called `fully explanatory property' - a propositional form of common knowledge of the model - which has been a hidden (and overlooked) assumption in epistemic modal logic. We sketch a theory that describes epistemic models in their generality. We argue for conceptual and practical value of new models, specifically for representing partial knowledge, asymmetric knowledge, and awareness.