Quasi-Propositions and Quasi-Individuals
Per Hasle, Peter ØHRSTRøM, Torben Braüner, Jack Copeland · 2003
Abstract Egocentric logic. Practitioners of tense logic are often asked the question, ‘If you admit as genuine propositions ones whose truth-value depends on when they are propounded, why not also admit ones whose truth-value depends on where they are propounded, or by whom, etc.?’ Why not, indeed? There are many sentences of ordinary speech which have precisely these peculiarities. The truth of ‘It is raining here’ does depend on where it is uttered, and so does the truth of ‘It is raining five miles away’ (and more generally of ‘It is raining there’)’, and the truth of ‘I am sitting down’ does depend on who says it, and so perhaps does that of ‘Eating bacon and bananas is nice’ ( = ‘I like it’) and ‘Jones is very tall’ ( = ‘He is much taller than I am’). Nor is it at all difficult to concoct a rigorously formalized language with similar features.