Relational Autonomy and Freedom of Expression
Susan J. Brison · 2000
Abstract A currently prevalent defense of the right to freedom of expression maintains that it rests on the right to autonomy. On this account, governmental restrictions on an individual’s speech and on a person’s access to another’s speech violate the person’s right to autonomy. In recent years, the autonomy defense of free speech has frequently been invoked in arguments against restrictions on hate speech, although it is rarely made clear in these arguments what is meant by “autonomy.” In an earlier article, “The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech,” I examined six accounts of autonomy in the philosophical literature and argued that none yields a satisfactory argument against restrictions on hate speech and that five fail as accounts of autonomy. I suggested that the sixth-a relational account of autonomy—succeeds as an account of autonomy but does not yield the conclusion that an autonomy-based defense of free speech precludes restrictions on hate speech.