Counter-TEMPEST: Information Spoofing based on the EM-leakage Signature of TMDS System
Euibum Lee, Dong‐Hoon Choi, Taesik Nam, Jong‐Gwan Yook · 2023
This paper proposes a new approach to counter the TEMPEST attack, which is one of the information theft methods using leakage electromagnetic waves. As various signal processing techniques and new algorithms have made existing response systems no longer effective, this paper imitates the leaked signal itself through the generation rules of the representative video signal protocol, TMDS, and simple source modeling. Based on this, this paper hypothesize a scenario for what kind of signal the TEMPEST attacker would collect if our leaked signal were radiated. The main scenario is to deceive the TEMPEST assailant by including intentionally wrong or strange information in our imitated leaked signal, which is called "Spoofing" as a strategy term. To experimentally validate such an approach, a TEMPEST system is constructed, and the results of the experiment are discussed briefly.