The Devil is in the Details: Hidden Problems of Client-Side Enterprise Wi-Fi Configurators
Ka Lok Wu, Man Hong Hue, Ka Fun Tang, Sze Yiu Chau · 2023
In the context of connecting to enterprise Wi-Fi, previous works show that relying on human users to manually configure or enforce server authentication often leads to insecure outcomes. Consequently, many user credentials can potentially be stolen by the so-called "Evil-Twin'' (ET) attack. To ease the burden of human users, various easy-to-use Wi-Fi configurators have been released and deployed. In this work, we investigate whether such configurators can indeed protect users from variants of the ET attack. To our surprise, the results of our investigation show that all configurators considered in the study suffer from certain weaknesses due to their design, implementation, or deployment practices. Notable findings include a series of design flaws in the new trust-on-first-use (TOFU) configurator on Android (available since version 12), which can be exploited in tandem to achieve a stealthy ET attack. Moreover, we found that 2 open-source Android Wi-Fi configurators fail to properly enforce server authentication under specific situations. The cause of these could be partly attributed to the complexity stemmed from certificate name matching as well as the limitations of the Android API. Last but not least, we found that a commercial configurator not only allows insecure Wi-Fi configurations to be deployed, but also the covert injection of certificates on the user device to facilitate interception of other TLS traffic, posing yet another hidden security and privacy threat to its users. All in all, this study shows that despite years of research on the topic, developing a user-friendly yet reliable Wi-Fi configurator remains an elusive goal, and thus the threat of ET attacks continues to be relevant. As such, it is time to rethink whether the complexity of the standard certificate chain validation is actually good for enterprise Wi-Fi.