Differential Cryptanalysis of K-Cipher
Mohammad Mahzoun, Liliya Kraleva, Raluca Posteuca, Tomer Ashur · 2022 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC) · 2022
K-Cipher is an ultra low latency block cipher with variable-length parameters designed by Intel Labs. In this work, we analyze the security of K-Cipher and propose a differential cryptanalysis attack with the complexity of$2^{29.7}$for a variant of K-Cipher with state size$n=24$bits state and block size$m=8$bits. Our attack recovers the secret key and secret randomizer values with a total length of 240 bits in$\sim 30$minutes on a standard desktop machine. We show that it is possible to extend the same attack for an arbitrary set of parameters.