Microwalk-CI
Jan Wichelmann, Florian Sieck, Anna Pätschke, Thomas Eisenbarth · Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · 2022
Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence have been proposed. However, a recent study at IEEE S&P 2022 showed that, while many developers are aware of one or more analysis tools, they have major difficulties integrating these into their workflow, as existing tools are tedious to use and mapping discovered leakages to their originating code segments requires expert knowledge. In addition, existing tools focus on compiled languages like C, or analyze binaries, while the industry and open-source community moved to interpreted languages, most notably JavaScript.