Power Analysis Attack on Locking SIB based IJTAG Achitecture
Gaurav Kumar, Anjum Riaz, Yamuna Prasad, Satyadev Ahlawat · 2022
Today’s integrated circuits contain a large number and variety of embedded instruments that support testing, infield monitoring, post-silicon validation, etc. The IEEE Std. 1687 (IJTAG) provides efficient access to these embedded instruments by dynamically reconfiguring the IJTAG network. At the same time, it opens a backdoor for malicious users to steal sensitive information. Hence, access to embedded instruments through IJTAG must be restricted/secured. Various techniques have been proposed to prevent unauthorized access to the IJTAG network. One such very effective technique that improves the security of IJTAG network is a secure access protocol that uses licensed access software, Locking SIB (LSIB) and Chip ID. Although this technique is simple to implement and is very effective against scan attacks; however, it does not consider the power analysis attack.In this study, it is demonstrated that the security of the secure access protocol technique could be easily breached using a power analysis side-channel attack. The attack leads to unauthorized access to the embedded instruments which in turn could be used for various malicious purposes. Moreover, a countermeasure that mitigates the efficacy of power analysis attack significantly is proposed. It incurs a minimal area overhead and can be easily integrated into the existing secure access protocol.