An Oracle-Less Machine-Learning Attack against Lookup-Table-based Logic Locking
Kaveh Shamsi, Guangwei Zhao · Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2022 · 2022
Replacing cuts in a circuit with configurable lookup-tables (LUTs) that are securely programmed post-fabrication is a logic locking technique that can be used to hide the complete design from an untrusted foundry. In this paper, we study the security of basic LUT-based locking against a set of oracle-less attacks, i.e. attacks that do not have access to a functional oracle of the original circuit. Specifically we perform cut graph/truth-table prediction using deep and graph neural networks with various data encoding strategies. Overall we observe that naive LUT-based locking with small cuts with 2 or 3 inputs may be vulnerable to oracle-less approximation whereas such attacks become less feasible for higher cut sizes. We open source our software for this attack.