Futurity in Default Semantics
Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt · 2006
0. The modality of will: An argument for default interpretations This paper contributes to the ongoing debate concerning the status of the English will as a marker of (i) tense, (ii) modality, or (iii) ambiguous between the two (see e.g. Fleischman 1982; Enç 1996; Werth 1997; Ludlow 1999). In particular, I concentrate on clearly modal uses of will as in (1) and (2) (epistemic and dispositional necessity respectively), as opposed to (3) where will has future time reference. (1) Mary will be in the opera now. (2) Mary will sometimes go to the opera in her tracksuit. (3) Mary will go to the opera tomorrow night. I demonstrate that when we adopt an approach to temporality based on event semantics (e.g. Parsons 1990; Kamp and Reyle 1993; Pratt and Francez 2001), the classification of will as modal turns out to be the most satisfactory solution of the three listed above. For this purpose I combine the analysis proposed in Discourse Representation Theory (henceforth: DRT, Kamp and Reyle 1993) with the theory of default interpretations (Jaszczolt 1999a, b; 2002a) and use the properties of (i) the intentionality of mental states, and their pragmatic equivalent of (ii) communicative, informative and referential intentions in communication in order to show that the degrees of intentions involved result in different interpretations of will. The strongest referential intention directed at the eventuality (state, event or process) results in the strongest commitment to the communicated eventuality and by the same token in the ‘weakest degree of modality’. The discussion of the properties of will is supplemented with a discussion of the semantic category of futurity. Sentence (3) is juxtaposed with expressions of futurity that use futurative progressive and so-called ‘tenseless future ’ as in (4) and (5) respectively.