Distance Bounding Protocols: Authentication Logic Analysis and Collusion Attacks
Catherine A. Meadows, Radha Poovendran, Duško Pavlović, LiWu Chang, Paul F. Syverson · 2006
In this paper we consider the problem of securely measuring distance between two nodes in a wireless sensor network.The problem of measuring distance has fundamental applications in both localization and time synchronization, and thus would be a prime candidate for subversion by hostile attackers.We give a brief overview and history of protocols for secure distance bounding.We also give the first full-scale formal analysis of a distance bounding protocol, and we also show how this analysis helps us to reduce message and cryptographic complexity without reducing security.Finally, we address the important open problem of collusion.We analyze existing techniques for collusion prevention, and show how they are inadequate for addressing the collusion problems in sensor networks.We conclude with some suggestions for further research.