True, false, paranormal and designated: a reply to Beall
Carrie Jenkins · Analysis · 2007
In Beall 2006 it is argued that, contra Priest (1987) and the dialetheists, we are not committed to true contradictions just in virtue of being committed to Beall argues that even if EC forces overlap between semantic categories (i.e. even if some sentences must belong to more than one such category if we accept EC), we are not forced to acknowledge overlap between the true and the false, and for that reason we are not forced to acknowledge true contradictions. Supposing an initial division into sentences which are true, sentences which are false and sentences which are ‘other’, we may need to admit some sentences which are both true and ‘other’, and that some are both false and ‘other’, but we don’t need to admit any which are both true and false. Beall proposes to illustrate this by describing a heuristic model language. Sentences of the model can take any...