Constant-Time Loading: Modifying CPU Pipeline to Defeat Cache Side-Channel Attacks
Yusi Feng, Ziyuan Zhu, Shuan Li, Ben Liu, Huozhu Wang, Dan Meng · 2021 IEEE 20th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) · 2021
Cache side-channel attacks exploit cache state changes to steal confidential information. The emergence of transient execution attacks, a new form of microarchitecture side-channel attack that can access any address, makes cache side-channel attacks more threatening. Most of these attacks infer information by measuring the execution time of load operations. Therefore, from the microarchitecture perspective, we propose a novel countermeasure against cache side-channel attacks by eliminating the access time difference caused by cache hits or misses. We use the constant-time loading mechanism to limit each load instruction's execution to a fixed time and specify this mechanism's wake-up condition to avoid excessive performance loss. We modify the CPU pipeline to simulate this design and run SPEC2006 applications. The results show that the performance loss of our mechanism is negligible.