Mindreading by simulation
Alvin I. Goldman, Jordan C. Lucy · Oxford University Press eBooks · 2013
This chapter updates the case for the simulation approach to mindreading. It shows how simulation theory successfully addresses four questions: (1) how mental-state attribution tasks are executed; (2) how simulation figures in the early acquisition of mentalizing; (3) how simulation comports with evidence about the neural basis of mentalizing, and (4) how it meshes with plausible accounts of brain evolution. A duplex approach to mindreading is presented that exemplifies the familiar dual-process model of cognition. “Enactment” imagination drives high-level mindreading whereas mirroring is the basis of low-level mindreading. The power of simulation is supported by a recent study showing that merely imagining eating can mimic genuine eating. Rival theories of mindreading (e.g., theory-theory and rationality theory) provide little or no explanation of many species of mindreading, especially attribution of sensations and emotions by means of facial expressions and other observable cues.