Hardware Trojan Detection by Delay and Electromagnetic Measurements
X.-T. Ngo, Ingrid Exurville, Sihvam Bhasin, Jean‐Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley, Zakaria Najm, Jean-Baptiste Rigaud, Bruno Robisson · 2015
Hardware Trojans (HT) inserted in integrated circuits have received special attention of researchers. In this paper, we present firstly a novel HT detection technique based on path delays measurements. A delay model, which considers intra-die process variations, is established for a net. Secondly, we show how to detect HT using ElectroMagnetic (EM) measurements. We study the HT detection probability according to its size taking into account the inter-die process variations with a set of FPGA. The results show, for instance, that there is a probability greater than 95% with a false negative rate of 5% to detect a HT larger than 1.7% of the original circuit.