Tournament Based Incentive Mechanism Designs for Mobile Crowdsourcing
Yanru Zhang, Yunan Gu, Lingyang Song, Miao Pan, Zaher Dawy, Zhu Han · 2015 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM) · 2015
With the wide adoption of smart mobile devices, there is rapid development of location based services. One key feature of supporting a pleasant/excellent service is the access to adequate and comprehensive data, which can be obtained by mobile crowdsourcing. The main challenge in crowdsourcing is how the service provider (principal) incentivize a large group of mobile users to participate. In this paper, we investigate the problem of designing a tournament to provide continuous incentives for users by rewarding them based on the rank achieved in crowdsourcing. First, we model the user's utility of reward from achieving one of the winning ranks in the tournament. Then, the utility maximization problem of the principal is formulated, under the constraint that the user maximizes its own utility by choosing the optimal effort in the crowdsourcing tournament. Furthermore, we show that, the tournament can approximate the optimal contract under full information by step function. Finally, we present numerical results to compare the system performance under the different proposed incentive mechanisms; we show that by using the tournament, the users obtain the continuous incentives to participate in the crowdsourcing activity.